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Third Party Conciliation 
and Trade Union Récognition 
Some British Evidence 
P.B. Beaumont 
The author uses information obtainedfrom the unpublished 
conciliation records of the ACAS régional office in Scotland to 
look at some of the potential influences on the likelihood of a 
trade union successfully obtaining récognition under thèse pro-
visions. Three sets of influence are applied using corrélation 
analysis. 
In Britain voluntary conciliation over matters in dispute between 
unions and management has been a widely accepted feature of the industrial 
relations System for almost a century1. The Conciliation Act 1896 and the 
Industrial Courts Act 1919 provided the Minister of the day with the power 
to establish procédural arrangements to settle union-management disputes, 
with perhaps the major such arrangement being conciliation. At the présent 
time the Employment Protection Act 1975, which repealed the Conciliation 
Act and parts of the Industrial Courts Act, gives the responsibility for pro-
viding conciliation services and facilities to the Advisory Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (henceforth referred to as ACAS). The essence of third 
party conciliation is that when bargaining reaches a deadlock an indepen-
dent party is introduced to try and help bring about a solution. The whole 
process is entirely voluntary in that the two parties in dispute both hâve to 
agrée to use conciliation, with the conciliator having no authority to make 
an enforceable judgment. The basic functions, and alleged advantages, of 
the conciliation process are well summed up in the following terms2, 
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Relat. ind., vol. 37, no 4, 1982 © PUL ISSN 0034-379 X 
827 
828 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 37. NO 4 (1982) 
The conciliator... helps the parties to communicate with each other more effectively. 
He can keep the température of the discussion down by confining it to the points at 
issue, and stating them in unemotive terms. When the parties lose their tempers with 
one another too easily to be able to talk face to face, he can go backwards and for-
wards between them. He may be able to devise proposais new in form or substance, 
which go some way to reconcile conflicting claims, or provide a rough compromise, 
or make it easier to give ground without losing face. He can save one side from trying 
to call the other's bluff when in fact it is not bluffing. Especially when both sides 
hâve stuck fast, thinking it a sign of weakness to be the first to climb down, he can 
get them to make concessions because he can tell each what the other will do in 
return, and can make what is given up appear as a favour to him, rather than a con-
cession to the other side. 
In short, the basic rôle of the conciliator is to clarify the areas of agreement 
and disagreement between the parties, act as an intermediary in the ex-
change of information and proposais, and to suggest approaches to a set-
tlement. 
During the décade of the sixties the annual number of conciliation 
cases handled by the Department of Employment (the responsible body 
prior to ACAS) varied between 300 and 450, but from the early 1970s the 
numbers hâve increased quite substantially3. The extent of this increase has 
been particularly marked since ACAS took over responsibility for the con-
ciliation function from the Department of Employment in 1974. There 
were, for exemple, 866 conciliation cases handled by the Department of 
Employment in 1973, but some 2,228 handled by ACAS in 1975 which was 
its first year of full opération. The relevant figures (i.e. requests for concili-
ation) for subséquent years are 3,460 (1976), 3,299 (1977), 3,338 (1978), 
2,677 (1979) and 2,091 (1980). The variation in the number of conciliation 
cases through time has been shown to be significantly influenced by changes 
in économie factors, such as unemployment and real wages4. 
It would appear that trade union récognition issues hâve figured pro-
minently in the workload of the responsible conciliation body at any point 
in time. For instance, in the three years 1970-72 some 31 percent of concili-
ation cases handled by the Department of Employment involved trade 
union récognition claims5, a figure only exceeded by disputes over wages 
questions (i.e. 38 percent of the total conciliation workload). Moreover, the 
particular appeal of conciliation to trade union officiais involved in seeking 
récognition for a particular group of workers is well documented in surveys 
3 J.F.B. GOODMAN and J. KRISLOV, "Conciliation in Industrial Disputes in Great 
Britain: A Survey of the Attitudes of the Parties", British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 
XII, No. 3, November 1974, p. 344. 
4 See L.C. HUNTER, "Economie Issues in Conciliation and Arbitration", British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. XV, No. 3, July 1977, pp. 226-45. 
5 Cited in GOODMAN and KRISLOV, op. cit., p. 335. 
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of the attitudes of unions towards the use of conciliation6. However, despite 
the above sort of figures and findings there hâve always been certain réser-
vations expressed about the ability of the conciliation method to deal ade-
quately with trade union récognition claims. The sorts of réservations that 
hâve been expressed are typified by the following extract from the written 
évidence of the Ministry of Labour (the forerunner to the Department of 
Employment) to the Donovan Commission (1965-68)7, 
There may be no common ground as to the facts about trade union membership 
which can, therefore, only be ascertained by thorough and independent investiga-
tion. Also on a récognition issue a conciliator who is seeking a basis for seulement 
cannot in practice take up a neutral position between the parties. He is bound to ap-
pear to the employer as an agent for the trade union. On gênerai grounds this is un-
desirable. 
Thèse sorts of réservations about the ability of the conciliation method to 
deal adequately with récognition disputes were in fact a part of the case 
made for setting up an independent tribunal to hear and recommend on 
union récognition claims brought under statutory provisions8. However, the 
two periods of expérience with the opération of statutory union récognition 
provisions in Britain (i.e. 1971-4 and 1976-80) hâve not been, to say the 
least, particularly satisfactory ones, from the management, unions or tribu-
nals point of view9. Indeed the difficulties during the years 1976-80 were of 
such magnitude that statutory union récognition provisions no longer exist 
in Britain, with Sections 11-16 of the Employment Protection Act 1975 hav-
ing been repealed by the Employment Act 1980. As a resuit, at the présent 
time, voluntary conciliation facilities provided by ACAS, under the terms 
of Section 2 of the Employment Protection Act 1975, are the only public 
policy based route to achieving union récognition in Britain. 
Thèse voluntary conciliation facilities were in fact available alongside 
the statutory récognition provisions throughout the period 1976-80. Indeed 
trade union récognition disputes were the second largest component (behind 
disputes over pay and other terms and conditions of employment) of 
ACAS's total conciliation workload in the years 1976-80, accounting for 
6 Ibid., p. 342. 
7 Quoted in George Sayers BAIN, "Trade Union Growth and Récognition", Research 
Paper No. 6, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations, London, 
HMSO, 1967, p. 100. 
8 See, for example, BAIN, loc. cit. 
9 See, for example, Bernard JAMES, "Third Party Intervention in Récognition Dis-
putes: The Rôle of the Commission on Industrial Relations", Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 8, No. 2, 1977; ACAS Annual Report 1980, London, HMSO, pp. 64-102; P.B. BEAU-
MONT, "Unionism, Collective Bargaining and Régulation: Statutory Récognition Provisions 
in Britain, 197'6-80", Mimeographed Paper, University of Glasgow, 1981. 
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between 17 and 24 percent of completed conciliation cases. Furthermore, 
there were actually more union récognition claims heard under the volun-
tary conciliation provisions (Section 2 of the Employment Protection Act 
1975) than under the statutory provisions (Sections 11-16 of the Employ-
ment Protection Act 1975) during thèse years; the relevant figures being 
2,292 and 1,613 cases respectively10. Moreover, the ACAS Annual Report 
for 1980 indicates that some form of récognition was established for about 
77,500 employées as a direct resuit of cases completed under the voluntary 
conciliation provisions, compared to a figure of some 65,000 employées 
who achieved this position via the statutory provisions11. This same report 
went on to indicate that union récognition claims under the voluntary con-
ciliation provisions involved relatively smaller companies, covered smaller 
groups of workers and were more likely to be for groups of manual workers 
than was the case under the statutory récognition provisions12. 
However, beyond thèse few relatively straightforward facts we hâve lit-
tle detailed information about the opération of thèse voluntary conciliation 
provisions in relation to trade union récognition claims. Accordingly, in 
what follows we use information obtained from the unpublished concilia-
tion records of the ACAS régional office in Scotland (there are nine ACAS 
régional offices in the country, with the Headquarters in London) to look at 
some of the potential influences on the likelihood of a trade union success-
fully obtaining récognition under thèse provisions. This type of unit level 
analysis has been undertaken on the claims heard under statutory union 
récognition provisions in both Britain and the United States13, but has not, 
at least to our knowledge, been undertaken on claims heard under less for-
mal public policy based arrangements such as voluntary conciliation. How-
ever, before turning to the détails of this analysis we présent in the next sec-
tion an outline of some of the basic characteristics of our set of récognition 
claims. 
THE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLAIMS 
The total of 290 récognition claims handled by the ACAS régional of-
fice in Scotland during the period 1976-80 constituted approximately 10 per-
cent of the total (country wide) ACAS workload in relation to récognition 
io ACAS Annual Report 1980, op. cit., p. 65. 
n Ibid., pp. 65 and 99. 
12 Ibid., p. 65. 
13 See, respectively, P.B. BEAUMONT, loc. cit. and Marcus H. SANDVER, "South-
Nonsouth Differentials in National Labor Relations Board Certification Election Outcomes", 
Journal of Labor Research, Vol. 2, Fall 1981. 
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claims heard under the Section 2 provisions over this period of time. There 
were 25 différent unions involved in bringing thèse 290 claims, but fully 
59.7 percent of the claims involved only three unions. Thèse three unions 
were the Transport and General Workers Union (28.3 percent), the Amal-
gamated Union of Engineering Workers (17.6 percent) and the Association 
of Clérical, Technical and Supervisory Staff (13.8 percent). No other union 
accounted for more than 10 percent of the claims, although the Association 
of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs fell only just short of this 
figure with a total of 8.6 percent. The majority of claims were for manual 
workers only (58.3 percent), with 39.7 percent being for non-manual work-
ers only. The mean size of the workgroup involved in the claim was 98 em-
ployées, although a standard déviation of 246 indicated that there was con-
sidérable variation in this regard. The smallest sized claim was in fact for 3 
employées, with the largest being for 3,350. The majority of claims (54.4 
percent) were for employées in an establishment that was part of a multi-
establishment set up, with the remaining 45.6 percent of the claims being for 
a single independent establishment. There was a sizeable range of industries 
represented in the claims, with 58 percent of them in the manufacturing sec-
tor and the remaining 42 percent being in services. The largest individual in-
dustry groups represented were the Distributive trades (12.7 percent), 
Mechanical engineering (12.3 percent), Miscellaneous Services (8.9 per-
cent), and Food, drink and tobacco manufacture (8.4 percent). 
The mean length of time taken to deal with the claim was 2.1 calendar 
months, with a similar sized standard déviation. The longest time taken to 
deal with any one claim was in fact 13.1 calendar months. There was actual 
or threatened strike action in only 9.8 percent of the claims. The basic out-
comes of the claims were as follows: 
Full Récognition Achieved 









The figures indicated that some form of récognition (full or partial133 was 
achieved in 47.3 percent of the 290 claims. The ACAS Annual Report for 
1980 indicates that 43 percent of completed voluntary conciliation cases in 
the country as a whole led to some form of récognition for the employées 
i3a A partial récognition recommendation may, for example, hâve involved a recom-
mendation that the union be recognized only for matters at the discrétion of the local plant 
management. 
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concerned14, which suggests that our data from the ACAS régional office in 
Scotland may not be unrepresentative of the outcomes in other offices. The 
ability to generalize from our data, with at least a reasonable degree of con-
fidence, is also suggested by the fact that our sample of claims involved 
smaller sized Workgroups, more manual groups of workers and took much 
less time to be heard than claims decided under the statutory provisions, 
which were ail points made in the ACAS Annual Report for 1980 récogni-
tion provisions where the overall opération of the voluntary and statutory 
were compared. Finally it is worth noting that the ACAS régional office in 
Scotland knew that at least 23.5 percent of the claims where récognition was 
not fully or partially achieved through voluntary conciliation were then 
taken up through the statutory récognition provisions, although we hâve no 
knowledge of their outcome in this regard. This figure does, however, point 
to a substantial degree of interdependency between the voluntary and statu-
tory routes to récognition, a fact that is of considérable importance and 
which will be returned to in our concluding section. 
THE DETERMINANTS OF UNION RECOGNITION SUCCESS 
In this section we seek to identify some of the systematic influences that 
appear to explain why récognition was achieved in claim A, and not in claim 
B. This exercise draws on the analysis and findings of studies conducted on 
claims heard under statutory récognition provisions in both Britain and the 
United States15. For example, such studies hâve revealed that récognition is 
more likely to be achieved for claims involving relatively small sized groups 
of workers. The sort of question posed hère is whether this type of finding 
also holds true for récognition claims heard under voluntary conciliation ar-
rangements. If this does not in fact prove to be the case, then there would 
appear to be definite limits to the ability to generalize the results of studies 
based solely on statutory récognition claims to other, less formai public 
policy means of resolving récognition disputes. The investigation of this 
matter, therefore, has important research and public policy implications. 
The starting point for our analysis is the assumption that the outcome 
of any individual récognition claim is a reasonably accurate reflection of the 
wishes of the employée group covered by that claim. This underlying frame-
work of analysis, which has typically been employed in studies of the influ-
ence of unit characteristics on récognition outcomes under statutory provi-
sions, may not, however, be entirely appropriate to an analysis of the out-
u ACAS Annual Report 1980, op. cit., p. 65. 
15 See the références cited in Footnote 13. 
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corne of récognition claims heard under voluntary conciliation arrange-
ments. The reason for this a priori réservation is the absence of a formai 
questionnaire or ballot of the employées concerned. The effect of such a 
ballot under statutory provisions is to focus union and management atten-
tion on the task of trying to influence the pattern of employée voting. A ma-
jor concentration of union and management attention along thèse lines is 
arguably less likely to occur under voluntary conciliation arrangements due 
to the absence of such a central focus or basis for deciding the outcome of 
the claim. For the moment, however, we proceed on the assumption that the 
wishes of the employées concerned with regard to récognition (or not) will 
be of paramount importance and that thèse wishes will in turn be influenced 
by three, interdependent sets of considérations: (i) the attractiveness of 
unionism and collective bargaining coverage in gênerai; (ii) the attractive-
ness of the particular union bringing the claim; and (iii) the extent and 
nature of employer opposition to récognition in gênerai, or to the particular 
union bringing the claim. The individual hypothèses and variables under 
thèse three sub-headings will be discussed in turn below. 
Under the first sub-heading we distinguish between claims for manual 
and non-manual workers only. The investigation of this particular influence 
follows from the extensive body of literature on the alleged différences in 
the attitudes of manual and non-manual workers towards the institutions of 
trade unionism and collective organization in gênerai. The essence of the 
argument about the alleged différences in attitudes is that non-manual 
workers who join unions are assumed to be motivated primarily by instru-
mental considérations which are sufficiently strong to outweigh their princi-
pled objections to unionism, whereas manual workers are assumed to be 
motivated primarily by a principled commitment to unionism16. This argu-
ment is certainly not without its critics17, but is sufficiently prominent in the 
literature to warrant considération hère. The expectation is that récognition 
is more likely to be achieved in claims for manual workers only. This is sup-
ported by some of our basic results which indicate that 64.3 percent of the 
récognition claims where full récognition was achieved were for manual 
workers only. Furthermore, 43.8 percent of the manual worker only claims 
achieved full récognition, compared to only 34.8 percent of the non-manual 
only claims, although a further 13 percent of the non-manual claims (only 3 
percent of the manual) achieved partial récognition. 
16 For studies that hâve considered this line of argument see, for example, D.E. 
MERCER and D.T.H. WEIR, "Attitudes to Work and Trade Unionism Among White Collar 
Workers", Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1972; F.G. COOK et al, 
"White Collar and Blue Collar Workers Attitudes to Trade Unionism and Social Class", In-
dustrial Relations Journal, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1975/6. 
n See Georges Sayers BAIN, David COATES and Valérie ELLIS, Social Stratification 
and Trade Unionism, London, Heinemann, 1973, pp. 126-36. 
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Turning to our second sub-vector, we musttake account of the argu-
ment that the supply of union organizing service's will vary in direct propor-
tion to the incentives on union leaders to expand their organizations18. The 
implication of this argument is that there is likely to be a wide variation in 
the amount of resources that unions are willing to allocate to recruitment 
and organizing activities. It has already been noted that a disproportionate 
number of our 290 récognition claims (59.7 percent) involved only three 
unions. The hypothesis hère is that récognition is more likely to be achieved 
in the claims of thèse three unions on the grounds that they are the most 
committed to expanding their organizations and hâve therefore devoted 
relatively more attention and effort to the task of building up a pro-union 
sentiment among the workers concerned. The basic results, however, did 
not provide any obvious support for this proposition, as 39.8 percent of the 
claims brought by thèse three unions achieved full récognition compared to 
a success rate of 39.3 percent among the claims of the other unions. The se-
cond variable under this particular sub-heading is the size of the workgroup 
involved in the récognition claim. The expectation hère is that récognition is 
more likely to be achieved in the case of smaller sized Workgroups. The a 
priori basis for expecting such a relationship is that the job related interests 
of workers in such units are likely to be more homogeneous in nature, which 
makes the unions 'selling job' somewhat easier — i.e. the union concerned 
will appear a much more attractive proposition to any individual employée 
if he is reasonably confident that most of the other employées in the unit 
want essentially the same thing from the union19. Certainly the mean num-
ber of employées in claims where full récognition was achieved was only 76 
compared to 130 in claims where récognition was not achieved, although it 
should be noted that there was very little différence between the médian 
sizes of the Workgroups involved (i.e. 33 and 38 respectively). 
Ideally we would like a direct measure of the extent of employer oppo-
sition to récognition in gênerai, or to the particular union involved in bring-
ing the claim. However, in the absence of any such measure we utilize as a 
proxy for such opposition the length of time that elapsed between the date 
the claim was referred to ACAS and the date the claim was cleared. This 
time delay factor we argue is a reasonable proxy for the extent of employer 
opposition to récognition, although we recognize that other simple adminis-
trative factors may also operate to lengthen the time period involved in 
18 See, for example, Monroe BERKOWITZ, "The Economies of Trade Union Organi-
zation and Administration", IndustrialandLabor Relations Review, Vol. 7, No. 4, July 1954. 
More recently see Richard N. BLOCK, "Union Organizing and the Allocation of Union Re-
sources", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, October 1980. 
19 See, for example, Gary M. CHAISON, "Unit Size and Union Success in Représenta-
tion Elections", Monthly Labor Review, February 1973, pp. 51-2. 
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hearing and reaching a décision on a claim. It is nevertheless important to 
explicitly test for this length of time influence as studies based on statutory 
récognition claims in both Britain and the United States hâve clearly indi-
cated that the longer the time taken to hear and report on a claim, the lower 
the probability of a union receiving a recommendation for récognition20. 
The basic results were certainly consistent with this expectation as the mean 
length of time for claims where full récognition was achieved was 1.8 calen-
dar months, compared to 2.2 calendar months where récognition was not 
achieved. 
As a second proxy for the extent of employer opposition to récognition 
we distinguish claims in an establishment that is part of a multi-plant set up 
from those in a single plant establishment. The available évidence in Britain 
indicates that existing union organization is significantly lower in single 
plant establishments21, on the grounds that such establishments are more 
likely to be administered in a 'paternalistic fashion' with the employer being 
relatively opposed to the intrusion of an external body such as a trade 
union. Accordingly, for the above reason, we expect that récognition will 
hâve been less likely to be achieved in claims in single, independent estab-
lishments. It was certainly the case that only 45.5 percent of the claims 
where full récognition was achieved came from single, independent estab-
lishments, although virtually the same proportion of claims from single in-
dependent establishments and multi-establishments (i.e. 39.2 and 39.4 per-
cent respectively) achieved full récognition. 
In considering an industry of employment effect one can take individ-
ual industry orders where existing levels of workforce organization are rela-
tively low and argue that employer opposition to récognition will be greatest 
in such industries. This is because the lack of a tradition of widespread 
organization may mean that employers in such industries are less likely to 
feel the 'odd man ouf in opposing récognition claims, and may genuinely 
believe, on the basis of historical expérience, that union organization is not 
appropriate to the circumstances of their industry. On the other hand, one 
might want to argue that the real source and strength of employer opposi-
tion to current récognition lies in the relatively few unorganized establish-
ments in the relatively highly organized industries. This is because it is thèse 
20 See, respectively, P.B. BEAUMONT, "Time Delays, Employer Opposition and 
White Collar Récognition Claims: The Section 12 Results", British Journal of Industrial Rela-
tions, Vol. XIX, No. 2, July 1981 and Richard PROSTEN, "The Longest Season: Union 
Organization in the Last Décade", Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Associa-
tion, Winter 1978, pp. 240-49. 
21 George Sayers BAIN and Farouk ELSHEIKH, "Unionization in Britain: An Inter-
Establishment Analysis Based on Survey Data", British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 
XVIII, No. 2, July 1980, p. 176. 
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establishments that hâve held out for so long against unions in the face of a 
strong, surrounding tradition of workforce organization. In viev/ of thèse 
two potentially offsetting hypothèses it is difficult to make an a priori pré-
diction about the sign on any individual industry order variable. As a re-
suit, we adopt the more broad brush approach hère of distinguiishing the 
manufacturing industry orders from the service sector orders, with no a 
priori hypothesis being put forward about the sign on this particular vari-
able. However, the basic figures did indicate that 61.7 percent of the claims 
where full récognition was achieved were in the manufacturing industry or-
ders, and that 42.8 percent of ail manufacturing industry order claims 
achieved full récognition compared to only 35.5 percent of claims in the ser-
vice sector. The final variable we enter hère is whether strike action actually 
occurred or was threatened during the period of time discussions were tak-
ing place on récognition. The contention is that such threatened or actual 
strike action indicates the présence of particularly strong employer opposi-
tion to récognition. This opposition is held to be of such strength that récog-
nition is unlikely to resuit so that a threatened or actual strike is negatively 
related to the likelihood of récognition being achieved. The strike weapon is 
therefore seen as a reaction to strong and sustained employer opposition, 
rather than as an early taken, positive initiative on the part of the union 
concerned. 
This complètes our list of potential explanatory variables and in the 
next section we présent the results obtained using corrélation analysis. (The 
dépendent variable is in the form full and partial récognition obtained ver-
sus the rest.) 
THE RESULTS 
The basic corrélation results obtained are set out in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
Corrélations Between Independent Variables and 
Whether Récognition (Full and Partial = 1) Was Achieved 
Non-manual (=1) 0.00949 
Particular union (3 major unions involved = 1) -0.01024 
Size of workgroup -0.05673 
Time involved -0.12244* 
Single independent establishment (=1) -0.05819 
Manufacturing industry orders (= 1) 0.08837 
Strike action (threatened or actual = 1) -0.10816 
* = statistically significant 
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The most obvious point to make about the Table 1 is that virtually ail 
of the variables fall short of statistical significance, which would seem to 
cast considérable doubt on the potential utility of the basic framework of 
analysis employed hère. That is, the influence of unit related characteristics 
operating on employée préférences for récognition, which has been devel-
oped in studies of the opération of statutory récognition provisions, appears 
to hâve relatively little explanatory power when applied to less formai 
public policy based means of resolving récognition disputes. Accordingly, 
future research will need to develop an alternative central focus to that em-
ployed hère. One possibility in this regard was suggested in discussions with 
individual ACAS conciliation officers. Such officers suggested that the pré-
sence (or not) of a small core of 'union activists' in the plant was frequently 
related to whether the récognition claim was successful (or not) from the 
union point of view. Thèse individual union activists were held to be of con-
sidérable potential importance in building up a reasonable base Une of ac-
tual union membership and a relatively 'pro-union sentiment' among the 
workforce that held out the expectation of considérable potential member-
ship if the récognition claim succeeded. The 'activist cores' are unlikely to 
be distributed randomly across the full set of establishments where récogni-
tion claims occur over any given period of time. Such cores could, for exam-
ple, be derivative from previous attempts at organization within the plants 
concerned. Certainly Rose found, admittedly on the basis of récognition 
élections held under statutory procédures in the United States, that unions 
were more successful in obtaining récognition where previous organizing at-
tempts had been made22. The Rose study divided union campaigns in firms 
with prior organizing activity into two catégories — the repeat organizing 
drive in which a second successive attempt is made to organize the same 
unit, and the non-repeat organizing drive which is centered on a différent 
unit of the same firm — and found that both catégories of prior organizing 
activity led to above-average success in obtaining récognition. In the case of 
the repeat organizing situations, union persistence and the timing of subsé-
quent organizing activities were largely responsible for the reversai of prior 
setbacks, and that in non-repeat cases success was associated with the proxi-
mity of other organized employées in the firm. This latter explanation in 
particular could well be highly relevant to the suggestion regarding the 
potential importance of the présence (or not) of an activist core in account-
ing for récognition success. 
The one significant variable in Table 1 was the length of time taken to 
hear and clear the claim by conciliation, the finding being that the longer 
22 Joseph B. ROSE, "What Factors Influence Union Représentation Elections?", 
Monthly Labor Review, Vol. XLV, October 1972, p. 51. 
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the time taken, the less likely that the union would be successful in achieving 
récognition, The argument underlying this variable was that the existence of 
substantial and sustained employer opposition to union récognition will 
draw out the length of time taken to conciliate a claim and can thus reduce 
potential employée support for the union through (i) a simple loss of inter-
est on the part of employées or through (ii) allowing time for active counter-
measures to the threat of unionization to be taken by the employer. Such 
counter-measures could include, for example, the encouragement of staff 
associations or the granting of carefully timed improvements in pay and 
other terms and conditions of employment. It would certainly be interesting 
to be able to identify the number and nature of employer counter-measures 
that were taken by employers in cases where the union claim was not suc-
cessful, in order to see whether there was any consistent pattern apparent. 
The use of such counter-measures, which would certainly be a useful topic 
for future research, is likely to hâve been of major importance in account-
ing for the union failure to achieve récognition. This is because the time in-
volved in hearing thèse conciliation claims was of such relatively short dura-
tion (i.e. mean time = 2.1 calendar months) that one would hardly expect a 
simple loss of employée interest to occur in such a space of time. 
The above information, which is essentially qualitative in nature, can 
only be adequately obtained by a séries of in-depth case studies conducted 
in the particular plants concerned. However, our existing data set does per-
mit us to examine the issue of whether the extent of employer opposition to 
récognition does vary in any systematic fashion. Accordingly, we consid-
ered whether any of our other unit related characteristics were themselves 
significant explanators of the length of time involved in reaching a décision 
on the récognition claims. The corrélation results obtained are set out in 
Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Corrélations Between Independent Variables and 
the Length of Time Involved in Reaching a Décision on Récognition 
Non-manual ( = 1 ) 0.05051 
Particular union (3 major unions involved = 1) -0.13971* 
Size of workgroup 0.19373* 
Single independent establishment (=1) -0.10698 
Manufacturing industry orders (=1) -0.14224* 
Strike action (threatened or actual= 1) -0.01716 
* = statistically significant 
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In this case we find that three variables are statistically significant, with 
relatively less time being taken to reach a décision on récognition claims 
from the three unions that were disproportionately involved in seeking 
récognition and in the manufacturing industry orders. The other significant 
variable indicates that a relatively long time was taken to reach a décision 
where the récognition claims involved relatively large sized Workgroups. 
The fact that employer opposition is greatest where claims involve rela-
tively large sized groups of employées is presumably a reflection of the fact 
the employer is unwilling to see significant sized inroads made into his non-
unionized workforce at a single stroke. A pragmatic union response to this 
sort of finding would seem to be one that involved attempting to build up 
organization among a given workforce on a step-by-step basis over a period 
of time. The particular union seeking récognition also seems to influence 
the extent of employer opposition to such récognition. This could be a func-
tion of the différent organizing tactics employed by différent unions, with 
some of them being relatively more acceptable to employers than others. 
Alternatively, it could be simply a function of the differing gênerai images 
conveyed by the various unions. If it is the former considération then a 
study of substantial potential interest, from the research, union, and public 
policy points of view, would involve identifying which particular organiza-
tional tactics adopted by unions are least likely to produce such entrenched 
employer opposition. Finally, the greater length of time involved in the ser-
vice sector claims would suggest that employer opposition to union récogni-
tion will generally be most marked in sectors which are relatively little 
organized at that particular point in time. The greater opposition in such 
sectors being a reflection of the generally widespread belief among such em-
ployers that union récognition is not appropriate to the particular circum-
stances of their sector(s) of employment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
One may summarize the findings and lessons of this paper from both a 
research and public policy point of view. First, from the research point of 
view, it would appear that the bargaining unit type of analysis, which has 
been developed in studies of union récognition élection outcomes heard 
under statutory procédures, offers relatively few insights into the opération 
of less formai public policy means for bringing about union récognition; at 
least in the sensé of being able to identify the relevant characteristics of 
claims where unions are successful. In saying this, however, one should not 
ignore the fact that employer opposition, as proxied by the length of time 
involved in hearing and deciding the claim, was found to be a significant in-
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fluence, as has been the case in élections held under statutory procédures. 
Moreover, this employer opposition was itself found to be strongly influ-
enced by a number of bargaining unit characteristics, namely, the particu-
lar union involved, the size of the employée group covered by the claim and 
the sector of employment where the claim occurred. Future research in this 
subject area should involve qualitative, in-depth case studies conducted in 
particular plants where récognition claims hâve been conciliated. Such case 
studies should look at the history of their employée-management relation-
ships, especially at past organizing attempts, and at the nature of union and 
management moves, counter-moves and tactics during the course of hearing 
and deciding the récognition claim. 
In considering the public policy implications of our research it is impor-
tant to note the fact that the réputation of the Section 2, voluntary route to 
récognition was riding high in Britain during the period 1976-80. This fact 
was clearly not independent of the obvious difficulties surrounding the 
opération of the statutory récognition provisions during the same period of 
time. Indeed the then Chairman of ACAS seemed to provide more than a 
strong hint that trade unions seeking récognition would be wise to look 
more to the Section 2 than the Section 11-16 procédures23. The note on 
which we conclude is to pose the question whether the réputation of the Sec-
tion 2, voluntary conciliation route to récognition will continue to remain 
high, at least in the eyes of the unions, now that the Section 11-16 provisions 
hâve been abolished. 
There are at least two reasons for thinking that this may not in fact re-
main the case. First, the type of claim taken through the two sets of procé-
dures was, as we hâve seen, rather différent, but now that the statutory pro-
visions hâve been repealed a rather différent type of claim is likely to in-
creasingly go through Section 2, in particular the claims involving large 
groups of non-manual workers that formerly went through the statutory 
procédures. The resuit of such a change is likely to be a réduction in the 
overall success rate, from the union point of view, in achieving récognition 
under Section 2. Secondly, ACAS conciliators hâve indicated to us that the 
potential availability of the Section 11-16 provisions in the background was 
an important factor in ensuring that employers were prepared to seriously 
discuss the récognition issue with the unions and themselves under the Sec-
tion 2 provisions. This interdependency of the two sets of provisions, which 
we mentioned earlier, obviously no longer exists so that employer opposi-
tion, as reflected in non-cooperation with ACAS or the use of delaying tac-
tics in any discussions, is likely to become increasingly évident in Section 2 
23 IDSBriefNo. 158, June 1979, p. 1. 
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claims. The resuit is quite likely to be increased operational difficulties for 
ACAS and a lowering of the union success rate in achieving récognition. 
In view of thèse sorts of changes it would be désirable if future research 
could be undertaken on Section 2 claims in the current period of time when 
the statutory provisions are no longer in existence. If such research reveals 
some of the changes and difficulties that we hâve suggested may occur then 
one might begin to see the émergence of demands for the re-introduction of 
statutory récognition provisions. At présent there are admittedly few signs 
of such a demand, but is is certainly a possibility that cannot be ruled out of 
hand in the years to corne in Britain. 
La conciliation par une tierce partie et 
la reconnaissance des syndicats en Grande-Bretagne 
L'utilisation des mécanismes de la conciliation volontaire pour résoudre les dif-
férends entre les syndicats et les employeurs a une longue histoire en Grande-
Bretagne où les revendications en matière de reconnaissance syndicale figurent en 
première place dans ce travail de conciliation. L'organisme à qui il appartient de 
pourvoir au processus de conciliation en Grande-Bretagne depuis 1974 se nomme le 
Service consultatif de conciliation et d'arbitrage (Advisory Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion Service). Pendant la période 1976-1980, des mécanismes législatifs de reconnais-
sance syndicale existaient également, mais le Service consultatif entendit plus de re-
quêtes que le Service existant en vertu de la loi. De plus, le type de réclamation en 
matière de reconnaissance syndicale différait totalement, les syndicats obtenant plus 
de succès sous le régime de la conciliation volontaire que sous le mécanisme législatif. 
Le présent article étudie le résultat de la totalité des requêtes en reconnaissance 
syndicale entendues par conciliation volontaire en Ecosse entre 1976 et 1980 par le 
Bureau régional du service consultatif de conciliation et d'arbitrage. Le nombre total 
des requêtes s'élève à 290, ce qui représente environ dix pour cent de toutes les requê-
tes en reconnaissance entendues par le Service au pays pendant toute cette période. 
Les syndicats ont réussi à obtenir la reconnaissance dans 47 pour cent de toutes les 
enquêtes en Ecosse, ce qui se compare aux statistiques pour l'ensemble du pays (43 
pour cent) et laisse deviner le caractère valable de l'échantillon. 
Dans un effort pour préciser la probabilité du succès d'une requête en recon-
naissance syndicale, une grille d'analyse fondée sur les études du résultat de votes de 
reconnaissance syndicale tenus sous le mécanisme de reconnaissance législatif fut 
mise au point. Cette grille d'analyse consiste en trois types d'influence: 1) l'attrait du 
syndicalisme et de la négociation collective en général chez les employés concernés; 2) 
la préférence du syndicat qui présentait la requête; 3) l'importance de l'opposition de 
l'employeur à la reconnaissance syndicale en général et au syndicat qui formulait la 
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requête en particulier. Sous ces trois rubriques, nous avons vérifié, par analyse corré-
lative, l'influence des variables individuelles suivantes: le statut non-manuel des em-
ployés, le syndicat particulier qui formulait la demande, l'étendue du groupe d'em-
ployés compris dans la requête, le temps nécessaire à l'audition et au jugé de la 
requête, le statut multi-établissements de l'entreprise, la menace ou l'existence effec-
tive d'une grève et le secteur d'emploi où il y a eu présentation d'une requête. 
Le manque de signification de la plupart des variables jette un doute considéra-
ble sur l'utilité de cette grille d'analyse pour identifier les facteurs pertinents valables 
pour obtenir gain de cause dans la reconnaissance d'un syndicat sous le système de 
conciliation volontaire. La seule influence significative résidait dans le temps néces-
saire à l'audition et à la décision de la requête en reconnaissance. En retour, cette op-
position de l'employeur se trouvait reliée à l'étendue du groupe visé par la requête, 
au syndicat particulier qui présentait la requête et au secteur de l'emploi où elle était 
présentée. En particulier, on s'est rendu compte que l'opposition était moindre dans 
le cas des syndicats le plus fortement engagés et dans le secteur manufacturier et 
qu'elle était plus marquée dans le cas des requêtes visant des groupes d'employés plus 
considérables. 
Les constatations et les conclusions de l'article ont été résumées à la fois dans un 
but de recherche et en vue d'une action politique. En ce qui concerne la recherche 
future, nous estimons qu'il est nécessaire de procéder par études de cas approfondies 
destinées à identifier l'histoire des relations professionnelles dans les établissements 
particuliers concernés ainsi qu'à identifier aussi les tactiques des syndicats et des em-
ployeurs au cours de la procédure de reconnaissance syndicale comme étant les 
facteurs-clés qui préparent le résultat des requêtes entendues sous ce régime. Au sujet 
des implications en matière d'action politique, nous estimons que certains change-
ments peuvent agir à l'avenir de façon à amoindrir l'enthousiasme des syndicats qui 
était apparent pendant la période 1976-1980 pour l'audition des requêtes sous le sys-
tème de conciliation volontaire, ces changements découlant de l'abrogation en 1980 
du régime législatif de reconnaissance syndicale. 
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